A False Dilemma: The Anti-Trinitarian Sleight of Hand
One of the most common rhetorical traps used by anti-Trinitarians takes the form of a seemingly clever dilemma. It is often framed like this: How many Gods died on the cross, and how many did not? At first glance, the question appears to force Trinitarians into a contradiction. In reality, it relies on a subtle but serious misuse of categories.
The argument proceeds as follows. If one says that one God died on the cross, namely Jesus, then the follow-up question is asked: How many Gods did not die? If the answer is “one,” then—so the argument goes—we now have two Gods: one who died and one who did not. If the answer is “zero,” then the Father must have died on the cross as well, which Trinitarians clearly deny.
On the other hand, if one answers the initial question by saying that zero Gods died on the cross, the anti-Trinitarian claims this implies that Jesus is not God at all. Either way, the conclusion is presented as unavoidable: Trinitarian theology is incoherent. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t.
The Equivocation Behind the Question
The reason this dilemma is deceptive is simple: it plays on shifting definitions of the word “God.” The meaning of the term is quietly changed depending on how the Trinitarian answers, creating the illusion of contradiction where none actually exists. This tactic is not unique to this particular question. It appears repeatedly in anti-Trinitarian argumentation, which is why Trinitarians must carefully analyze how theological terms are being used before answering.
As I have already shown in multiple article (see 1, 2, 3), the word “God” does not have a single, rigid meaning within Trinitarian theology. Rather, it is used in multiple, well-defined ways depending on context. In one sense, “God” refers to the one divine essence—the singular divine nature fully possessed by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In another sense, “God” can be used to refer to a specific divine person. Sometimes this is the Father, particularly because he is the Monarchia, the fountainhead or principle of origin within the Trinity. At other times, the title “God” is applied to the Son, precisely because he possesses the same divine nature.
This usage is not arbitrary. As demonstrated in this article, the early Church Fathers were explicit about this distinction. Gregory of Nazianzus, for example, writes:
“Define our piety by teaching the knowledge of: One God, unbegotten, the Father; and One begotten Lord, his Son, referred to as ‘God’ when he is mentioned separately, but ‘Lord’ when he is named together with the Father—the first on account of the [divine] nature, the second on account of the monarchy.”
(ORATION 25:15-16) also (Fathers of the Church Series, vol.107, select orations, pp.170-171) for the Greek text see Patrologiae Cursus Completus – Series Graeca – Volume 35 – Gregory of Nazianzus 1, p.1220 starting from Ὁρίζου δὲ χαὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν εὐσέθειαν…
Here, Gregory shows that the term “God” can legitimately pick out a specific person precisely because that person possesses the divine nature. The title does not float free of meaning, nor does it collapse distinctions within the Trinity.
A loose parallel can be found in Scripture’s use of the term “Adam.” In some contexts, “Adam” refers to human nature in general—“male and female he created them…and called their name Adam/Mankind.” (Genesis 5:1–2). In other contexts, it refers to a specific individual: the first man, the husband of Eve. The same word can signify either a nature or a particular person, depending on how it is being used. Confusion only arises when these meanings are blurred.
This brings us to a crucial metaphysical principle that is often ignored in popular-level objections: natures do not act; persons act through natures. A nature is abstract. It does not perform actions. It does not suffer, speak, or die. Persons, who exist with a nature, are the agents of action. All activity is personal activity, even though it is carried out according to a given nature.
With this in mind, the question “How many Gods died on the cross, and how many did not?” immediately demands clarification. The proper response is not a number, but another question: What do you mean by “God”?
If by “God” one means the divine essence, then the answer is straightforward: zero. The divine nature was not crucified, did not bleed, and did not die. If the response is then, “Well, then Jesus isn’t God,” the equivocation has been exposed. The term “God” has suddenly been shifted from referring to the divine essence to referring to a specific person—namely, the Son.
More often, however, what is meant by “God” in this question is the Trinity as a whole. In that case, the answer is that God both died and did not die, but in different respects. Since actions belong to persons, and since the one God exists as three persons, the Son—who alone assumed a human nature—truly died. The Father did not. God died in respect of the Son and did not die in respect of the Father.
If an appeal to contradiction is made at this point, it rests on a misunderstanding of what a contradiction actually is. A contradiction only exists when the same thing is affirmed and denied in the same respect. Since death is a personal action, and we believe in 2 distinct persons, then the respects are clearly different. The Father is not the Son. Therefore, there is no logical inconsistency whatsoever.
Once the shifting definitions are exposed and the basic metaphysical distinctions are kept intact, the supposed dilemma loses all force. What appeared to be a fatal contradiction turns out to be nothing more than verbal sleight of hand.